Germany is the biggest country by population and GDP in Europe and the EU; it is also a country embroiled in a political crisis that has made its so-called traffic light coalition crumble, with new elections scheduled for the 23rd of February. The conservatives of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) are currently far ahead in the polls; however, even if they do win with the most optimistic of outcomes, they will still be forced to form a coalition government. The countries of the V4 will face risks and opportunities arising from the February election outcome, depending on the political program that emerges victorious in Germany.
The Possible Outcome of the German Elections
The key points of the CDU/CSU manifesto carry special importance to the four countries. The manifesto highlights the importance of working with Poland (and France) in setting the tone, on an EU level, in fighting illegal immigration, and improving Europe’s economy, security, and defence. In the same measure, the CDU/CSU also plans to expand German infrastructure towards its neighbouring countries. This statement marks a key departure from the traditional Franco-German alliance as the key axis deciding European affairs, with the German conservatives recognizing the growing relevance of Poland in the wider EU setting. Furthermore, this coincides with a tougher stance on migration and asylum policies, marking a German shift to the right and, in turn, aligning closely with Visegrad governments, which all have similar views on the same topic. This creates a possible convergence point between Germany and the V4, a stark contrast to the relationship seen with the Merkel and Scholz governments. This is a clear opportunity for the Visegrad group to leverage its power in influencing the EU’s stance on migration.
The outcome of the German elections will likely result in a CDU/CSU-led coalition, presenting various risks and opportunities for the Visegrad countries.
Economic Risks and Opportunities for the V4
German trade with Central and Eastern Europe has reached 562 billion euros, according to Reuters, and amidst this large trade volume, Poland and Czechia stand out, both being among the top 10 trading partners, Czechia, for example, accounts for 4.5% of German imports. Hungary and Slovakia, although not on the same scale, also have favourable and substantial trade relations with Germany. All this to say that the V4’s economy is highly interconnected with Germany’s.
However, the German economy has seen better days, with the last two years effectively seeing a stagnation in growth, in turn bringing consequences for the Visegrad countries. This being considered, the success of Merz’s economic policies will present key opportunities - or risks - for the group. One key risk that is currently rising is related to the V4’s involvement in global value chains, where Germany is their main partner; it is, for example, by far the main foreign value-adding country for the group as a whole. This could present an issue in industries such as automobiles, where companies like Volkswagen have invested heavily in the region; some analysts estimate that German automotive exports are set to decline by 20% in the next decade, therefore posing a risk to all the Visegrad factories and suppliers involved in the process. Merz is planning to tackle this through tax cuts, energy cost reductions, and by reducing the benefits for electric vehicles (he has blamed Volkswagen’s current difficulties on their focus on e-mobility); if he doesn’t succeed in revitalizing the German automotive industry, a serious risk might be lurking for the Visegrad countries.
Security and Defense: A Growing Divide Between Germany and the V4
In security and defence, the CDU/CSU is presenting an even more hawkish stance on Russia than the SPD which already has a strict stance on Russian aggression, emphasising more support for Ukraine through “diplomatic, financial, and humanitarian means and with arms deliveries.” It also advocates for a strengthened security and defence industry with extended collaboration and production in Europe, and finally, a European defence shield. All these push towards deeper European integration in defence and security and a firmer stance on Russia. Poland, with Donald Tusk at the helm, shares very similar views with the CDU/CSU in defence, security, and the stance on Russian aggression, something which is bound to approximate the two countries as we are currently seeing in the restoration of the Weimar Triangle (the regional forum formed in 1991 between France, Germany and Poland in which the three coordinate approaches to cross-border and European issues).
Meanwhile, Hungary and Slovakia are pursuing the opposite direction with a softer stance on Russia, advocating for diplomatic solutions and peace negotiations while limiting their support for Ukraine. Czechia is projected to soon follow the path of the latter two countries, as ANO is leading the polls for the 2025 elections by a wide margin, campaigning on a similar rhetoric in terms of security, European integration, and foreign policy towards Ukraine as both Orbán and Fico. Overall, the CDU/CSU's policies on security and defence, if enacted by their win in February, can effectively substantially weaken the Visegrad group’s unity.
The Future of V4-Germany Relations: Cooperation or Fragmentation?
The outcome of the German elections that will likely result in a CDU/CSU-led coalition presents various risks and opportunities for the Visegrad countries. While Merz’s fiscal and migration policies have the potential to align Germany and the Visegrad closer together, the divergences in security and foreign policy, mainly on Ukraine and Russia, pose the risk of undermining the group's unity. Furthermore, the relationship between the two sides depends on the success of a Merz-led government in revitalising the German economy and industry, particularly the automotive sector. It is ultimately an election that can redefine the entirety of regional dynamics.
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